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Free Will versus the Programmed Brain

已有 905 次阅读2013-9-7 15:53 |个人分类:体育 娱乐 生活| Free-Will, Programmed-Brain, cheat, moral


Free Will versus the Programmed Brain
If our actions are determined by prior events, then do we have a choice about anything—or any responsibility for what we do?
By Shaun Nichols

Many scientists and philosophers are convinced that free will doesn’t exist at all. According to these skeptics, everything that happens is determined by what happened before—our actions are inevitable consequences of the events leading up to the action—and this fact makes it impossible for anyone to do anything that is truly free. This kind of anti-free will stance stretches back to 18th century philosophy, but the idea has recently been getting much more exposure through popular science books and magazine articles. Should we worry? If people come to believe that they don’t have free will, what will the consequences be for moral responsibility?

In a clever new study, psychologists Kathleen Vohs at the University of Minnesota and Jonathan Schooler at the University of California at Santa Barbara tested this question by giving participants passages from The Astonishing Hypothesis, a popular science book by Francis Crick, a biochemist and Nobel laureate (as co-discoverer, with James Watson, of the DNA double helix). Half of the participants got a passage saying that there is no such thing as free will. The passage begins as follows: “‘You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. Who you are is nothing but a pack of neurons.”
The passage then goes on to talk about the neural basis of decisions and claims that “…although we appear to have free will, in fact, our choices have already been predetermined for us and we cannot change that.” The other participants got a passage that was similarly scientific-sounding, but it was about the importance of studying consciousness, with no mention of free will. 
 
After reading the passages, all participants completed a survey on their belief in free will. Then comes the inspired part of the experiment. Participants were told to complete 20 arithmetic problems that would appear on the computer screen. But they were also told that when the question appeared, they needed to press the space bar, otherwise a computer glitch would make the answer appear on the screen, too. The participants were told that no one would know whether they pushed the space bar, but they were asked not to cheat.  

The results were clear: those who read the anti-free will text cheated more often! (That is, they pressed the space bar less often than the other participants.) Moreover, the researchers found that the amount a participant cheated correlated with the extent to which they rejected free will in their survey responses.

Varieties of Immorality

Philosophers have raised questions about some elements of the study. For one thing, the anti-free will text presents a bleak worldview, and that alone might lead one to cheat more in such a context (“OMG, if I’m just a pack of neurons, I have much bigger things to worry about than behaving on this experiment!”). It might be that one would also find increased cheating if you gave people a passage arguing that all sentient life will ultimately be destroyed in the heat death of the universe.  

On the other hand, the results fit with what some philosophers had predicted. The Western conception idea of free will seems bound up with our sense of moral responsibility, guilt for misdeeds and pride in accomplishment. We hold ourselves responsible precisely when we think that our actions come from free will. In this light, it’s not surprising that people behave less morally as they become skeptical of free will. Further, the Vohs and Schooler result fits with the idea that people will behave less responsibly if they regard their actions as beyond their control. If I think that there’s no point in trying to be good, then I’m less likely to try.

Even if giving up on free will does have these deleterious effects, one might wonder how far they go. One question is whether the effects extend across the moral domain. Cheating in a psychology experiment doesn’t seem too terrible. Presumably the experiment didn’t also lead to a rash of criminal activity among those who read the anti-free will passage. Our moral revulsion at killing and hurting others is likely too strong to be dismantled by reflections about determinism. It might well turn out that other kinds of immoral behavior, like cheating in school, would be affected by the rejection of free will, however. 

Is the Effect Permanent?

Another question is how long-lived the effect is. The Vohs and Schooler study suggests that immediately after people are made skeptical of free will, they cheat more.  But what would happen if those people were brought back to the lab two weeks later?  We might find that they would continue to be skeptical of free will but they would no longer cheat more.

There is no direct evidence on this question, but there is recent evidence on a related issue. Philosopher Hagop Sarkissian of the City Univeristy of New York and colleagues had people from Hong Kong, India, Colombia and the U.S. complete a survey on determinism and moral responsibility. Determinism was described in nontechnical terms, and participants were asked (in effect): whether our universe was a deterministic universe and whether people in a deterministic universe are morally responsible for their actions.

Across cultures, they found that most people said that our universe is not deterministic and also that people in the deterministic universe are not responsible for their actions. Although that isn’t particularly surprising—people want to believe they have free will—something pretty interesting emerges when you look at the smaller group of people who say that our universe is deterministic. Across all of the cultures, this substantial minority of free will skeptics were also much more likely to say that people are responsible even if determinism is true.  One way to interpret this finding is that if you come to believe in determinism, you won’t drop your moral attitudes. Rather, you’ll simply reverse your view that determinism rules out moral responsibility.  

Many philosophers and scientists reject free will and, while there has been no systematic study of the matter, there’s currently little reason to think that the philosophers and scientists who reject free will are generally less morally upright than those who believe in it. But this raises yet another puzzling question about the belief in free will. People who explicitly deny free will often continue to hold themselves responsible for their actions and feel guilty for doing wrong. Have such people managed to accommodate the rest of their attitudes to their rejection of free will? Have they adjusted their notion of guilt and responsibility so that it really doesn’t depend on the existence of free will? Or is it that when they are in the thick of things, trying to decide what to do, trying to do the right thing, they just fall back into the belief that they do have free will after all?

DELANY DEAN, JD, PhD

delanydean.com

KC Mindfulness

crimlawdoc@gmail.com

INTRODUCTION: Are we actually “free” to make choices about our behavior, or is our sense of freedom just an illusion cooked up by our brains? A lot of hard-core behaviorists (I think there might still be some of those folks), neuroscientists, and philosophers are of the opinion that human freedom is, indeed, an illusion. This idea is, of course, very counter-intuitive. Much of our lives seems to be occupied by trying to decide what to have for lunch, and suffering from regret over what we decided to have for lunch, yesterday. And, if we truly are not “free” to make choices, then what is the point of having a criminal justice system that punishes people for making bad choices, in the hopes of deterring others from choosing badly? What about this whole “morality” business? And what about this business of psychotherapy, in which we try to help people to make better choices, so they can have better lives?

This whole discussion is closely related to the question (or problem) of “mind.” Our minds, of course, are where we engage in making choices. Are our minds “nothing more than” fleshy machines, operating on electrochemical signals? Perhaps these signals determine the “choices” we make, before we are even aware of the “feeling” that we are making a “choice.” Might it be true that our behavior is governed by circumstances and contingencies that are entirely beyond our control, and of which we are mostly ignorant?

In the rest of this page, you can see some of my writing and my thoughts (and some links) about these issues.

NEUROSCIENCE AND FREE WILL

Here is a VERY nice (video) scholarly discussion of brain science, freedom (free will), and responsibility. This topic is of great interest today among thinking people in many academic disciplines: philosophy, psychology, law, theology, and everybody else, for that matter!

“EVIL” AND FREE WILL

If you get into thinking about the evil that people do, you might also begin to think about the question of human freedom (or not). One of the strongest assumptions underlying our criminal justice system is that (absent some forms of brain damage or mental illness) human beings are totally free to choose to commit crimes (or not). Some people think that isn’t really very accurate. Here is a nice short discussion of free will and neuroscience.

ARE WE ROBOTS, OR NOT?

Yesterday I went to a meeting of my book club, where one of the topics we discussed was the old question: when people are in terrible situations, why don’t they leave? I should explain that two members of this book club are career prosecutors, one is a judge, and one (me) is a former prosecutor, a former defense lawyer, and a forensic psychologist. The person who raised the “why don’t they leave?” question was a prosecutor, and a good friend of mine (we were colleagues at one time, trial lawyers in the Jackson County Prosecutor’s Office). What I noticed was that prosecutors tend to have a firm attachment to a model of human mental and behavioral functioning in which it is held that all humans are fully free to make rational decisions about their actions; and that, accordingly, decisions and behaviors that appear to be unreasonable are motivated by factors such as courage (or the lack of courage), stupidity, greed, lust, or just plain evil-ness. Most psychologists would disagree with that model; we know that human decision-making is influenced by many factors that operate outside our awareness, and that much of our behavior is simply automatic, not truly a product of any kind of “deciding.” We also know that, even in cases in which the subjective experience is that we have freely decided to engage in a certain action, our brains have begun preparing for that specific action for as long as 6 seconds before we experience the conscious intention to engage in or choose that action. Benjamin Libet did the initial work that confirmed this phenomenon back in the 1980′s; more recently, there’s an fMRI study that has just been published that confirms and extends Libet’s work (the abstract for that new study is here). Libet (and others) gave considerable thought to the implications of their work. One way to interpret the findings is that we may not genuinely have what we think of as “free will”; what we might be said to enjoy, instead, might be called “free won’t.” In other words, it may be that we have the mental capacity to, in effect, “veto” the actions that our brains automatically prepare to engage in. This would be a version of human freedom that would prevent us from the need to view ourselves as no better than organic robots with a fancy, but essentially superfluous, consciousness about our own activities.

One blog writer had this to say:

Libet’s study sparked a great deal of controversy, as some saw it as a denunciation of free will. And rightly so, as Libet himself suggested the only evidence in support of free will is our own assertion that it exists… [But this work] doesn’t exclude the existence of free will. Even Libet maintained that there was a role for consciousness in decision-making, not in initiating an act, but in the ability to suppress it… the capacity to reverse a decision made by the unconscious brain would support a type of free will.

And another one of my favorite blogs, MindHacks, brought up the issue in the context of possible future development and implementation of what might be called “neuroweapons” that could use brain signals to trigger firing (see this discussion). What might it be like if a weapon could be developed that would fire, based not on a conscious decision made by a human who pulls a trigger or pushes a button, but on the activities going on in his (or her) brain that are outside of, and previous to, conscious awareness? Could a person who operates such technology even be considered responsible for his or her actions? Here is part of their discussion:

This concept [of legal and moral responsibility] is based on the theory that the conscious mind forms an intention, and an actions follows… [But now] we know that this idea is outdated… [Yet it is still] assumed that, at least for healthy individuals, we have as much control over stopping our own actions as starting them. [But] the US government’s defence research agency, DARPA, is currently developing new military technologies, dubbed ‘neuroweapons’, that may throw these assumptions into disarray.

The webpage of DARPA’s Human Assisted Neural Devices Program only mentions the use of brain-machine interfaces in terms of helping injured veterans, but p11 of the US Dept of Defense budget justification [pdf] explicitly states that “This program will develop the scientific foundation for novel concepts that will improve warfighter performance on the battlefield as well as technologies for enhancing the quality of life of paralyzed veterans”.

In other words, the same technology that allows humans to control computer cursors, robot arms or wheelchairs by thought alone, could be used to target and trigger weapons.

Even if only part of the process, such as selecting possible targets, is delegated to technology that reads the unconscious orienting response from the brain, that still means that part of the thought process has automatically become part of the action.

So, it may be true that we are not robots… but (only?!) that we can, in a sense, turn ourselves into something that is at least somewhat like a robot… All this is fairly mind-boggling, is it not?

And so there are major questions about the genuine nature of human freedom, and I think that’s a very big deal, something that causes most of us to sit up and take notice.

FREE WILL AND STEERING WHEELS

There’s a really intriguing blog (The Garden of Forking Paths) that appears to be primarily devoted to discussions among philosophers about freedom, moral responsibility, volition, and so forth. It is fairly accessible and really interesting, including all the major schools of thought about this subject. I especially enjoyed the comments that appeared below an entry about the recent discussions about the experiments that appear to demonstrate that students are more likely to cheat on a test if they have recently heard a lecture telling them that neuroscience “proves” there is “no free will” (here is an example of one of the write-ups about these experiments). The introductory sentence in this write-up (in the NYT) is: “If there is no such thing as free will, do you really have to put that money into the office coffee kitty when no one is looking?” The idea being, of course, that there is a danger that science will tell us things that end up making us bad people (note that this at least somewhat resembles the fearfulness, in some religious circles [and especially in Kansas!], that surrounds the teaching of evolution). It was this “Garden” blog that reminded me of a recent article by

It was this “Garden” blog that reminded me of a recent article by Roy Baumeister(one of my favorite social psychologists, especially on the subject of “evil”) in a major psychology journal (Perspectives on Psychological Science). Dr. Baumeister describes a viewpoint about human freedom that is very similar to my own long-held view (that human freedom is quite limited, and in some cases practically non-existent) and also consistent with the recent work involving the apparent 6-second time lag between brain-based decision-making, and the conscious perception of “making a choice to do something.” Here’s how he expressed the idea (sometimes known, technically within philosophy, as “compatabilism”): “[it may be] that there are two systems for guiding behavior: a default one that mostly runs the show and an occasional one that sometimes intervenes to make changes. Free will should be understood not as the starter or motor of action but rather as a passenger who occasionally grabs the steering wheel or even as just a navigator who says to turn left up ahead.”

Anyway, Baumeister is a major figure in the area of human freedom (he recently published a fascinating study indicating that people are less capable of resisting temptation when their blood glucose levels have dropped).

MEDITATION AND HUMAN FREEDOM

Meditation Practice and Human Freedom: As I noted above, most psychologists and other scientists understand that human freedom is not unlimited (some psychologists are actually determinists, believing that human freedom is totally illusory; but I think that concept is a dead end, and will not deal with it in this post). If we reflect upon it, I think all of us would acknowledge that, as a practical matter, much of our behavior is thoughtless, even “automatic.” We all have what we call “knee-jerk reactions.” We all can probably recall occasions when we did something (maybe something contrary to our values), but cannot say “why” we did it, and cannot really recall making a conscious decision to do it. In my work as a forensic psychologist, it has many times been my sad experience to evaluate a person facing murder charges who tells me (when I ask him what his thoughts were, just before he killed someone): “I didn’t think about it; it justhappened!” There is, in such cases, the sense that the act of killing was something that happened to him, instead of by him (and these are people who do not have a psychiatric condition). And, in the (much more common) situations in which people engage in compulsive (or addictive) behaviors, they certainly have the subjective sense that their capacity for self-control is severely lacking (or even entirely absent).

The good news about this picture is that we need not be helpless in the face of limitations in our capacity to exercise freedom. One of the primary reasons that we engage in so much thoughtless, automatic behavior is that we allow ourselves to become lost in thought, even as we are going through the activities of our daily lives. We just “go through the motions,” while mentally engaged in activities such as planning for the future, or re-hashing the past. In other words, we allow ourselves to be “mindless,” a state in which we fail to pay attention to what is going on (within our minds, and in our surroundings), right this very moment. And, when we are mindless, we can easily act on an impulse that we never even realized that we had (resulting in what would label a “knee-jerk reaction”). Within psychology and psychiatry, in treating compulsive/addictive behavior, we teach people to pay closer attention to their thoughts and emotions, so that they can detect the beginnings of an impulse (or craving) early enough to make a conscious decision to head it off… and, in this way, they can begin to change their behavioral patterns, even those that have often felt uncontrollable.

This type of attentional training, or attentional enhancement, is a one very important aspect of meditation practice. Over and over again, we bring our mind into a state in which we are deliberately paying attention to what is going on right now, this very moment. As we do this, our brains become more capable of shifting attention from the internal train of mental chatter (worrying about the future, thinking about the past); and we are better able to remain consciously aware, in our daily lives. And, when this happens, we are also improving our capacity for self-control, because we actually know what we are thinking and feeling, and how we are responding to environmental triggers, in the here-and-now (instead of later, after we have done something that we might regret!).

In the Mind Hacks blog, there is a short discussion of a new article by Richard Davidson and his colleagues, about the effects of meditation practice on attentional processes; they note that: “many… studies… have reported interesting effects. For example, highly experienced focused attention meditators need minimal effort tosustain attentional focus, while even short courses on meditation can improve attention and decrease stress.” In our contemporary world, one in which we all seem to suffer from attentional deficits to one degree or another, the implications are obvious…

Conclusion: I think it is fair to say that contemporary neuroscientists would agree that it was with very good justification that Joseph Goldstein, the great meditation teacher, titled one of his books (one I highly recommend!): Insight Meditation: The Practice of Freedom.

Non-Human Animals and Morality

I saw an interesting article in the NYT about the “beginnings of morality” found in non-human primates. Various of the apes have been observed to behave in pro-social, even self-sacrificial ways. Chimps, who cannot swim, sometimes drown trying to save other chimps struggling in the water. Hungry rhesus monkeys will ignore food if it is set up in such a way that getting the food will cause pain to others. Do we call this “morality”? Some feel threatened and outraged, or dismissive, when these “behaviors” are labelled as “moral.” Similar arguments take place among those who study violence and aggression. Some say that violent human behavior is very much innate, and does not differ in essential ways from violent/aggressive behavior among non-human animals. Others insist that all aggressive behavior in humans is learned from the environment. There are two main “camps” in these arguments. One group of us humans wishes to see a sharp dichotomy between humans and other animals, so that our similarities are minimized, and our differences are seen more as differences in “kind” than in “degree.” Christian doctrine, for some, requires or at least promotes such a distinction. Another group of humans tends to rely on evolutionary theory and observations of continuities. They tend to assert that it is simply obvious that humans are a species of animal, a very interesting species indeed, but not substantially different (i.e., different in substance) from other species. And, unfortunately, these two camps perceive each other with distrust, fear, and/or contempt. Their stances tend to be polarized and contrasted with each other; there are few efforts to find common ground. I wonder, can there not be continuities that bring the two camps together? I, for one, am fond of continuities. I am not a fan of polarities, nor of “black and white” thinking. My life and my studies have convinced me that the whole shebang is a gray area, and that discontinuities are fundamentally illusory.



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