作秀不最重要！YC：创业者会被虚假工作分心: 融资,媒体曝光

作秀不是最重要！硅谷YC：创业团队会被虚假工作分心。虚假工作指的是那些轻而易举就可以完成，比真实工作更有趣的任务。有两种虚假工作最容易出现，一是融资，二是媒体的个人曝光；我们发现很多有潜力的创始人着迷于1种或2种虚假工作中，无法自拔，最终的结果大家都知道，创业失败。

但是，小弟觉得 Sam 可能说的还是自己，YC 还是以作秀为主，替自己和孵化器里的初创融资，和自己也经常媒体曝光。但莫非这就是所有孵化器都需要做的事情？有没有其他更加踏实的方法与运营孵化器？




YC主席：75%的创业团队走出孵化器就忘了本
http://tech2ipo.com/101320    Rowson 发布于2015-08-21

本文作者Sam Altman，是美国著名种子轮孵化器Y Combinator的创始人、合伙人之一，现任孵化器的主席。今天凌晨，Sam Altman在博客中发表了《YC孵化后的衰落》一文，表达了对许多经过YC孵化的创业企业走向下坡的惋惜，直言这些走下坡路的原因是离开孵化器之后便顺着自己的方法来走，忘记了导师教给他们的知识。并表示，如果创业者能继续坚持YC里学到的东西，创业成功率能提高一倍。
以下是全文翻译：
每一轮Y Combinator孵化结束之后，我们的合伙人认为大约有25%的创业公司能最终走上正轨，朝着十亿美元估值的目标迈进。但实际上，只有很少的公司能做到这一点，绝大多数公司要么活得很憋屈，要么就直接死掉了。
在Y Combinator孵化的时候，这些公司取得了非常漂亮的增长曲线，然而Y Combinator孵化结束之后的几个月里，这些公司的心电图成了“一条直线”。如果我们孵化的所有企业都成功了的话就好了，可是并没有，所以我们在思考为什么会出现这样的局面？为什么他们在Y Combinator的这段时间里这么成功，但是出去之后就见光死了。
最主要的问题是这些孵化企业出去之后就忘了Y Combinator孵化时导师们教给他们的事情，他们不再专心地去开发产品或者专心地去增长，而是把注意力放在了其他所有的事情上面。而且出去之后，他们工作量的越来越少，效率也越来越低。因为在Y Combinator里，隔壁桌的创业团队带来的压力是他们前进的重要推动力量。
然后他们会找各种各样的理由来推脱责任：“我们是在做长期战略工作。你个外人，不明白。”“我们团队正在清理技术债务呢。”“我们正在组建、扩展团队呢。”“我们这个月的重点是PR。我要在6个会议上发言，还要给网站写2篇文章。”“我们和其他团队不一样；增长对于我们来说，不是最重要的事情。”听到自己孵化的创业团队对我们说出这样的话，真的是非常伤心。
一般来讲，创业团队会被虚假工作分心。虚假工作指的是那些轻而易举就可以完成，比真实工作更有趣的任务。有两种虚假工作最容易出现，一是融资，二是媒体的个人曝光；我们发现很多有潜力的创始人着迷于1种或2种虚假工作中，无法自拔，最终的结果大家都知道，创业失败。
在孵化器里，我告诉创始人要做和公司增长相关的工作。能给公司带来明显增长的就是开发产品和销售产品。当然招聘也是列表中排得很靠前的一个，因为需要招聘、长大队伍才能讲增长率保持在一个数值之上。
在Y Combinator的那段时间里，我们会无情地提醒创业团队虚假工作没有任何效果，而且无论你做多少虚假工作，都不会转变创业可能会失败的局面。我们也会无情地问询最近的增长状况，如果你的增长率没有达标的话，Y Combinator的合伙人也会残忍地当着你的面说出来。离开了Y Combinator，我们与创业团队的联系就少了，想骗我们就骗吧。如果创业团队用虚假工作来骗我们，那基本上可以判定这个公司要完了。

完成目标才是创业公司最重要的事情。如果你给公司设定了里程碑目标，那么你的创业团队将比其他团队活的时间更长。如果你没有设定里程碑目标，那你现在需要做的就是去设定一些目标，否则，你的公司也将很快完蛋。创始人在Y Combinator孵化的时候能够将这一原则内化；但是Y Combinator毕业之后的几年里，很多人都忘了。烧钱率（资金消耗率）高是在一些做的不好的创业公司会直接影响创始人的心态，然后导致整个公司像一个失去重心的陀螺一样，陷入恶性循环。实际上，Y Combinator给创业团队的戒律中就有这一条：“永远别让公司失去里程碑目标！”
还有几个常见的问题。其中之一是在融完一笔钱或者完成了一个大任务之后的“我们成功了！”的错觉。融到一笔钱或者开始出名之后，创始人会发现很难去承认自己并没有做好，也不愿去改变方向。当然，小团队即便是拿着一个特别烂的产品，也能取得一些小成绩。但是几个月之后，用户数字大到一定程度之后，就不再增长了，因为你开发的产品人们不喜欢用，除非改进、转型，否则不会有增长。
那么创业公司如何避免这种走出孵化器之后的“无主”状况呢？干好真实的工作。继续专心开发用户喜欢的产品，完成设定的增长目标。可以试着组建一个董事会来让自己做的事情可控制，不能忘记自己在Y Combinator时的那种紧张感。要持续给投资人发送项目进度，以及任何会看到你们项目的人（Y Combinator正在开发一个自动跟踪软件），希望借助他们监督的力量来避免出错。宁可操太多心，也不能不去操心，更不要把时间浪费在无关紧要的事情上，要学会保护自己的时间。绝对不要在取得成功之前就有一种“我已经赢了”的心理。我现在都没有觉得Airbnb的创始人觉自己已经成功了。创业者，至少还要在未来几年的时间里高强度的工作。
我现在都没有觉得Airbnb的创始人觉自己已经成功了。创业者，至少还要在未来几年的时间里高强度的工作。
许多Y Combinator的创业团队在出去一两年后就明白了这些道理，但是对于许多团队来说，明白了又怎样，太晚了，或者是明白了再去改，结果又浪费了一次时间。
到目前为止，我们孵化过的最好的创业团队们，他们走出去之后依旧按照Y Combinator学的那一套在创业。听起来很简单，很容易，但是没有几个人能做得到。
但好在只要下功夫还是能做到。如果每个创业者（不管是Y Combinator的还是其他孵化器的）都能这么做，成功创业团队的数量可能会翻倍。





The Post-YC Slump
英文原文：http://blog.samaltman.com/the-post-yc-slump    2015-8-20
At the end of a YC batch, the general consensus among the partners is that about 25% of the companies are on a trajectory that could lead to a multi-billion dollar company.  Of course, only a handful of them do.  Most go on to be decent or bad.

These companies have a beautifully exponential growth curve during YC, and then a few months after YC is over, it essentially flatlines.  Because it would be so much better for us if this did not happen, we wonder a lot about why.

The main problem is that companies stop doing what they were doing during YC—instead of relentlessly focusing on building a great product and growing, they focus on everything else.  They also work less hard and less effectively—the peer pressure during YC is a powerful force.

The startups justify this to themselves in all sorts of ways—“We’re doing some longer-term strategic work.  You wouldn’t understand.” “We’re cleaning up our technical debt.” “We’re building out the organization.” “We’re focusing on PR for this month.  I’m going to speak at 6 conferences and writing two thought leadership pieces.” “We are different; growth isn’t our most important thing.” We’ve heard all of these from startups that have gone on to disappoint.

In general, startups get distracted by fake work.  Fake work is both easier and more fun than real work for many founders.  Two particularly bad cases are raising money and getting personal press; we’ve seen many promising founders fall in love with one or (usually) both of these, which nearly always ends badly.  But the list of fake work is long.

I tell founders to consider how directly a task relates to growing.  Obviously, building and selling are the best.  Things like hiring are also very high on the list—you will need to hire to sustain your growth rate at some point.  Interviewing lots of lawyers has got to be near the bottom.

During YC, we are ruthless about reminding startups that fake work does not count and will still get you a failed startup no matter how intensely you do it.  We are also ruthless about asking for your progress, and being honest with you if things aren’t working.  After YC, we have less contact with startups—you can go dark on us if you want.  This, by itself, is almost always a sign that a startup is doing badly.

Momentum is everything in a startup.  If you have momentum, you can survive most other problems.  If you do not have momentum, nothing except getting momentum will solve your problems.  Founders internalize this during YC; many seem to forget in the few years after YC.  Burnout seems to almost always affect founders whose startups are not doing well, and then becomes a downward spiral.  In fact, one of my top few startup commandments is “never let the company lose momentum”.

There are a few other common problems.  One is a feeling of “we made it” that comes after a big financing round and a reduction in intensity.  A related problem is that after you’ve raised a lot of money or become somewhat well-known, it’s harder to admit that things aren’t working and you need to change direction.  Also, very small startups can grow by sheer force of will, even with a bad product.  This stops working after a few months as the numbers get larger, and if you haven’t built something people love, you will not be able to continue growing.

So how can startups avoid this slump?  Work on real work.  Stay focused on building a product your users love and hitting your growth targets.  Try to have a board and peers who will make you hold yourself accountable—don’t lose the urgency that you developed during YC.  Keep sending updates on your traction to your investors and anyone else who will read them (in fact, we’re building some new software at YC to automate this for our startups in the hope that it prevent some of them from going off the rails).  Make the mistake of focusing too much on what matters most, not too little, and relentlessly protect your time from everything else.  Don’t ever let yourself feel like you’ve won before you have.  I still don’t think the Airbnb founders feel like they’ve won.  You have to keep up a high level of intensity for many, many years.

Many YC startups learns these lessons after a year or two in the wilderness, but for some it’s too late and for all it’s a waste of time.

The best startups we fund keep on doing exactly what they did during YC.  This sounds so simple and so obvious, but in practice so few founders do it.

The good news is it’s doable with deliberate effort.  If every founder (YC and otherwise) did it, the number of successful startups would probably double.





The head of Silicon Valley's most intense startup factory shares how founders can double their chance of success    http://www.businessinsider.com/y-combinator-sam-altman-startup-advice-2015-8

Sam Altman, the head of Silicon Valley's prestigious Y Combinator startup accelerator program, shared in a blog entry some hard truths about the 75% failure rate of the startups that it mentors:

A lot of founders get so caught up in the startup lifestyle that they forget to build their product. It's a lesson that applies to all startups, Y Combinator or otherwise.

During the three months of the Y Combinator program, Altman writes, the companies grow nicely. Y Combinator has fostered high-profile startups like Airbnb, Dropbox, and Zenefits.

But then, after the program is over, "[growth] essentially flatlines" for some of the startups.

What happens to those startups is that they go on to focus more on speaking at conferences, talking to the media, or rearchitecting their infrastructure than they do at focusing on growth.

"In general, startups get distracted by fake work. Fake work is both easier and more fun than real work for many founders," Altman writes.

Moreover, there can come "a reduction in intensity" that comes alongside landing a big funding round. Compounding the matter is the fact that a well-funded startup is more resistant to a change in direction. And, no matter what, as a startup gets bigger, it's harder to keep the growth train moving.

Altman says the way to avoid this is to just focus on building the product, and making it into something people will actually want to use. Basically, stay hungry and don't let up on getting better.

"Don’t ever let yourself feel like you’ve won before you have. I still don’t think the Airbnb founders feel like they’ve won. You have to keep up a high level of intensity for many, many years," Altman writes.

Some startups never learn this lesson, Altman says, and by then "it’s too late and for all it’s a waste of time."

But if more founders embraced the idea of keeping up the Y Combinator rate of intensity, Altman writes, "the number of successful startups would probably double."


Why startups fail, according to their founders
http://fortune.com/2014/09/25/wh ... -to-their-founders/
by  Erin Griffith  @eringriffith  SEPTEMBER 25, 2014

The top reason? They make products no one wants.

When the founder of a startup company shuts down her or his business, it’s customary to pen an essay that tells the rest of the community what went wrong. Call it a failure post-mortem. Nine out of 10 startups fail, which is why the failure post-mortem has become so common that it’s practically a Silicon Valley cliché. Some of these essays are honest, enlightening, and brave. Others point fingers or issue backward non-apologies. Medium, the publishing platform, is the preferred medium.

The proliferation of the failure post-mortem has helped create a bizarre cult of failure that seems wrong-headed. Celebrating failure (“Fail fast” goes the mantra) seems to let people off the hook for bad behavior. Upon closer inspection, it seems less misguided than necessary. Starting a high-growth business is a roller coaster. Founder-CEOs feel pressure to keep up the facade of success, even when things are actually falling apart behind the scenes. Only recently, after the tragic suicide of Jody Sherman, CEO of a startup called Ecomom, did the technology community begin to publicly acknowledge the problems with its “entrepreneur as hero” narrative. Publicly admitting to failure, and examining it, can take guts. It also distills the narrative to a case study from which other entrepreneurs can learn.

CB Insights recently parsed 101 post-mortem essays by startup founders to pinpoint the reasons they believe their company failed. On Thursday the company crunched the numbers to reveal that the number-one reason for failure, cited by 42% of polled startups, is the lack of a market need for their product.

That should be self-evident. If no one wants your product, your company isn’t going to succeed. But many startups build things people don’t want with the irrational hope that they’ll convince them otherwise.

The most prominent modern example of this phenomenon is the mobile phone. People dismissed it as a novelty in its early days. Obviously, cell phones are no longer a novelty. The late Apple co-founder Steve Jobs famously said, “A lot of times, people don’t know what they want until you show it to them.” The problem is that entrepreneurs have taken that to heart. For every $19 billion company like Uber, the private transportation service, there are countless frivolous products that never catch on.

Beyond the idea, there are more practical reasons startups fail. Polled founders also cited a lack of sufficient capital (29%), the assembly of the wrong team for the project (23%), and superior competition (19%) as top reasons for failure.




The self-assessment lines up, for the most part, with what industry experts have said. Paul Graham, a partner at the Y Combinator startup accelerator, wrote in 2007 that startups usually die because they run out of money or a founder leaves.

Steve Hogan, who runs a startup turn-around shop called Tech-Rx, says companies with founded by one person—that is, no partners—are most likely to fail. He ranks product demand, or a lack thereof, second. The existence of a co-founder helps avoid many of the reasons cited at the bottom of the CB Insights chart, he says, including disharmony, poor marketing, and the wrong team.

Running out of cash does not cause a startup’s failure, Hogan says—it’s merely a symptom of another issue. Excluding instances of “stupid spending” or the inability to raise capital in the first place, startups tend to run out of cash when a CEO has overlooked all other indicators of failure. “Unfortunately, sometimes it’s the only ‘symptom’ that the leadership sees,” he says.