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天使投资唐 发表于 2014-10-12 13:22:33 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
之前与一硅谷律师聊,他们每天面对很多创业项目,但告诉我他鄙视一些因运气好,去一家创业公司打工,之后上市或被并购,出来后自称是创业公司的骨干和成功关键,经常在媒体或大会上作秀,忽悠到不少投资。但他们根本就不算创业,也更不算联合创业者Co-Founders。国内也如此。 >>@趋势影响研究:很多原来创业赚了点钱的人,没有选择继续创业,是因为他们没有找到更好的创业项目,而至于那些所谓创业成功的名字叫联合创始人的人,只不过是站在台风口上的“猪”。

@好投网: 搭便车问题  >>@趋势影响研究: 苹果公司的成就,来源于史蒂夫·乔布斯的连续创业项目成功。史蒂夫·乔布斯的成就,来源于苹果公司的资源大平台。

唐:所以国内很多土豪淘第一桶金后都很难继续,去美国或退休后没多久就将钱烧光。但起码土豪们还算创业成功,不像搭便车的员工,顾问或投资者,更难再中彩票。//@Dreamer陈镜头:虽说好运气也是成功要素之一,但运气好不可能一辈子,夸大其词,忽悠作秀大谈成功,简直弱爆了,大多数没本事,生意不好马上跑路。

搭便车问题(free rider problem),或“免费搭车”理论

http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E6%90%AD%E4%BE%BF%E8%BD%A6%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98
http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/%E6%90%AD%E4%BE%BF%E8%BD%A6%E9%97%AE%E9%A2%98#

  由美国经济学家和社会学家曼柯·奥尔逊 (Mancur Olson) ,于1965年发表的《集体行动的逻辑:公共利益和团体理论》(The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and the Theory of Groups)一书中提出的。其基本含义是不付成本而坐享他人之利。是一种发生在公共财上的问题。指一些人需要某种公共财,但事先宣称自己并无需要,在别人付出代价去取得后,他们就可不劳而获的享受成果。

  搭便车问题是一种发生在公共财产上的问题。是指经济中某个体消费的资源超出他的公允份额,或承担的生产成本少于他应承担的公允份额。指一些人需要某种公共财产,但事先宣称自己并无需要,在别人付出代价去取得后,他们就可不劳而获的享受成果。是常指宏观经济学中的公共品的消费问题。

  在财政学上,免费搭车是指不承担任何成本而消费或使用公共物品的行为,有这种行为的人或具有让别人付钱而自己享受公共物品收益动机的人成为免费搭车者。
  免费搭车现象缘于公共物品生产和消费的非排他性和非竞争性。
  免费搭车行为往往导致公共物品供应不足。
  搭便车行为妨碍市场的自动调节过程。因此,一个成功的意识形态必须能够克服“搭便车”行为,这是各种意识形态的一个中心问题。在诺思看来,意识形态是一种行为方式,它通过提供给人们一种“世界观”而使行为决策更为经济。

搭便车问题的经济学含义
  公共物品消费的非排他性和非竞争性使得公共物品的消费和生产具有自己的特点,同时给市场机制带来一个严重的问题——搭便车问题。搭便车问题往往导致市场失灵,使市场无法达到效率。
  一个拥挤的十字路口,由于没有红绿灯的控制,每辆车都急于通过路口,从而导致路口变得更加拥挤,每辆车都无法通过。设置一个红绿灯的成本为50,000元,一年该路口通过100,000辆汽车,每辆汽车由于能够顺利的通过路口而节约的成本为10元。由于节约的成本1,000,000元大于50,000元,设置红绿灯是有效率的。
  市场会提供这个有效率的结果吗,可能性比较小。公共物品的非排他性使得通过市场交换获得公共产品的利益这种机制失灵。对于红绿灯提供者而言,他必须能够把那些不付钱而享受红绿灯的人排除在消费之外,否则他将无法弥补生产成本。而对于一个消费者而言,由于公共产品的非排他性,公共产品一旦生产出来,每一个消费者都可以不支付就获得消费的权力,每一个消费者都可以搭便车。消费者这种行为意味者生产公共产品的厂商很有可能得不到弥补生产成本的收益,在长期中,厂商不会提供这种物品,这使得公共物品很难由市场提供。



克服搭便车问题的制度
  由于公共物品的非排他性和非竞争性,导致市场在公共物品供给上是无效率的,因此,公共物品的供给主要是由政府来提供的,但也有私人提供的。政府提供公共物品并不等于政府生产全部公共产品,单纯由政府生产和经营公共产品,由于多种原因往往缺乏效率。因此,政府的职能应该是提供公共产品,而不是生产公共产品。特别是对准公共产品,政府常常通过预算或政策安排给企业甚至私人企业进行生产。还有政府也可能通过对生产公共产品的企业进行补贴的方式来鼓励公共产品的生产。公共物品提供的方式主要有如下几种:

  1、政府提供。政府直接向公民提供各种公共物品,这是现实生活中最普遍的方式。如国防、安全、公共道路、给排水等。
  2、政府与私营机构签订合同。国家与企业签订经营公共产品,这是最普通、范围最大的一种形式。适应这一形式的公共产品成本,主要是具有规模经济的自然垄断性产品,如大部分基础设施。如国家允许私人企业以建设——经营——转让(BOT)的方式参与公共基础设施及服务的提供,即政府允许私人企业投资建设公共基础设施,并通过若干年的特许独家经营,等到收回自己的投资并获得利润后,再由政府接收该公共基础设施。如广西的马江至梧州高速公路。
  3、政府授予私营机构经营权。政府将现有的公共基础设施以授予经营权的方式,委托给私人公司经营,如自来水公司、供电等。此外,还有很多的公共服务项目也是由这种方式经营的,如政府将城市卫生管理、绿地维护、市政设施维护等委托私人管理。
  4、政府给提供公共物品的私营机构提供补贴。例如,补助津贴、优惠贷款、减免税收等,政府提供财政补贴的主要领域是科学技术、基础研究、教育、卫生保健、住房、图书馆、博物馆等。
  5、私人提供。以广播节目为例。广播节目是公共物品,既无竞争性,也无排他性。但却有私人提供。如私人电台,或者私人办的节目。在中国的官办电台里,一些节目也承包给私人。提供广播节目的私人,如私人电台或承包官办电台的节目的个人或者企业,虽然不能从广播节目的消费者中收取费用,但却可以向广告发布者收取广告费。一些海上灯塔也是有私人经营的,经营者虽然没有办法向使用灯塔的船只收费,但却可以向港口收费,因为如果港口不交费,灯塔经营者就关闭灯塔,从而船只也就不能来你这个港口了。这与广告商愿意交付广告费是同样的道理。这两个例子涉及到复杂的合约安排问题,希望详细了解的读者可以学习《新制度经济学》中的合约理论。


A public good is a good or service that can be used by everyone in society. It is impossible to exclude anyone from using it and all the people who wish to use it can do so at the same time (simultaneous consumption). A fine example of a public good is street lighting. Everyone can use it and it would be impossible to limit its consumption.
The problem with public goods is that a lot of people do not contribute to the funds necessary for their provision. This is known as the free rider problem. People figure that since the good is non exclusive, in other words nobody can prohibit them from using it, they can get away with not paying for its provision.
So society is split between cooperators, the people that do pay, and free riders.



搭便车问题案例分析
案例:
  在日常生活中常可找到搭便车的例子,例如许多轮船公司不肯兴建灯塔,他们可以获得同样的服务,此种搭便车问题会影响公共政策的顺利制定及有效执行。

案例:
  德国的高福利政策也是搭便车问题的例子,高收入者支付的高额税收对同样享用高福利(医疗、教育)的低税收贡献者来说是被后者“搭了顺风车”。

案例:街道卫生设施改造
  假设在一条街道有25名住户,并且本街道即将进行卫生设施改造,改造的费用为$2500。因此分摊到每个住户的改造费用为$100。虽然设施的改造会使得所有住户都可以受益,但当费用是自愿支付时,肯定会有一部分的住户拒绝交纳。这部分住户盘算着其他住户会分担改造费用,而此种卫生设施肯定会投入使用。
  解决方法是使得25名相互独立的住户作为一个整体支付这笔费用,即集体意志代表个人意志。在此情况下,住户可以通过投票决定是否进行设施改造。如果投票的结果认为应该进行改造,则所有住户都必须交纳费用。
  正是由于这个原因,一些公共服务,如国防、公共治安等,就必须由政府组织提供。
  当然,仅仅通过投票决定还没能把问题解决。住户们还需要对费用的分摊比例进行讨论,因为一种平均分配费用的原则又显得无法公平的反映用户之间的差异。


案例:TCL
  为了迅速普及和推广一个品牌,很多企业都选用与品牌相适应的明星来代言,这种“名人效应”从某一方面来讲,也是一种“搭便车”。
  TCL为了打造“ 国产手机第一品牌”的国际化形象,斥巨资1000万元聘请“韩国第一美女”金喜善,并力邀国际级导演张艺谋担纲广告片的拍摄。金喜善美丽、高贵、大方,符合产品本身的特质,同时她的国际化背景和对中国年轻时尚群体的巨大感召力也是TCL品牌可以搭便车的重要因素。在金喜善出演的TCL手机品牌形象的广告中没有一句台词,金喜善只是利用自己的肢体语言和表情表达出她对TCL手机的喜爱和信赖。这部广告片在中央电视台的黄金时段进行了投放,取得了很好的传播效果,TCL手机“中国手机新形象”的传播语传遍全国。应该说,邀请金喜善的策略对于迅速打响TCL手机品牌而言是正确而有效的。

案例:图书市场
  在图书市场上同样存在搭便车的例子:比如,前几年有一本《谁动了我的奶酪》畅销,市面上立即出现了《我该动谁的奶酪》、《谁也不能动我的奶酪》等一系列跟风书;又如《绝对隐私》一书,跟风的“隐私”一片,脱得光光追着让你看,哪有“隐私”可言。书倒都畅销了,手法却千篇一律。
  善于投机的企业总是可以充分利用外部性坐收渔翁之利。同时也正是由于便车的便利性的存在,行业的先导者在大张旗鼓地进入某个领域的时候,也应该尽量减少投机者利用自己的宣传声势所形成的便车的机会。“搭便车”与“反搭便车”的斗争就像一场猫与老鼠的战争,其中的妙义就在于在法律允许的范围内谁的手法更为天衣无缝,巧夺天工。

国家元首评论:
  2014年8月8日,美国总统奥巴马在接受《纽约时报》专栏作家弗里德曼专访时谈到如何看待中国,以及中国在世界上扮演的角色,奥巴马称“中国搭了30年的便车了,且一直没有什么问题,没有人指望他们做任何事情”。
  2014年8月22日,正在蒙古国访问的中国国家主席习近平前往蒙古国家大呼拉尔发表演讲。习近平表示,中国愿意为周边国家提供共同发展的机遇和空间,欢迎大家搭乘中国发展的列车,搭快车也好,搭便车也好,我们都欢迎。




http://baike.baidu.com/view/574903.htm
搭便车(free rider)
我们会发现,厂家经常采用搭便车策略,一些弱势产品跟进强势产品,借力“铺货”,最大限度地减少新产品进入市场的阻力,使新产品快速抵达渠道的终端,从而尽快与消费者见面。对没有强大实力的弱势产品而言,搭强势品牌的“广告便车”是一条切实可行的策略。我们来看看神奇牦牛搭便车的例子。彼阳牦牛在电视、报纸媒体上进行密集性广告轰炸,而这恰恰给神奇牦牛窥见了行销机会。神奇牦牛悄悄渗透终端,采用终端跟进策略,争取哪里有彼阳牦牛铺货,哪里就有神奇牦牛守阵,也取得了很好的销售业绩。神奇牦牛的包装色调与彼阳牦牛几乎雷同,包装盒面积比彼阳牦牛要大,但价格稍低,其终端展示形象比彼阳牦牛更显牛气。
在图书市场上也存在搭便车的例子:比如,前几年有一本《谁动了我的奶酪》畅销,市面上立即出现了《我该动谁的奶酪》、《谁也不能动我的奶酪》等一系列跟风书;又如《绝对隐私》一书,跟风的“隐私”一片,脱得光光追着让你看,哪有“隐私”可言。书倒都畅销了,手法却耐人寻味。
善于投机的企业总是可以充分利用外部性坐收渔翁之利。同时也正是由于便车的便利性的存在,行业的先导者在大张旗鼓地进入某个领域的时候,也应该尽量减少投机者利用自己的宣传声势所形成的便车的机会。“搭便车”与“反搭便车”的斗争就像一场猫与老鼠的战争,其中的妙义就在于在法律允许的范围内谁的手法更为天衣无缝,巧夺天工。(蒋丽梅)

搭便车现象
所谓”搭便车现象”是指某种事情产生了正外部性,所谓外部性是指经济主体(包括厂商或个人)的经济活动对他人和社会造成的非市场化的影响。分为正外部性和负外部性。正外部性是某个经济行为个体的活动使他人或社会受益,而受益者无须花费代价,负外部性是某个经济行为个体的活动使他人或社会受损,而造成外部不经济的人却没有为此承担成本。比如说某工厂为生产产品而排放了污水,这就污染了河流从而影响到周围人的身体健康,而周围人与这个工厂没有经济上的来往,同时这个工厂又不给周围人经济赔偿,这种情况就叫做负外部性.又比如一个人在院子里点烟花给自己欣赏,但放烟花的同时不但给他带来了快乐也给他周围在看烟花的人带来了快乐,而周围的这些人却不需要为此付出成本,这就产生了正外部性,又叫搭便车,即周围的人搭了这个人放烟花的”便车”。

经济学含义
公共物品消费的非排他性和非竞争性使得公共物品的消费和生产具有自己的特点,同时给市场机制带来一个严重的问题——搭便车问题。搭便车问题往往导致市场失灵,使市场无法达到效率。
一个拥挤的十字路口,由于没有红绿灯的控制,每辆车都急于通过路口,从而导致路口变得更加拥挤,每辆车都无法通过。设置一个红绿灯的成本为50,000元,一年该路口通过100,000辆汽车,每辆汽车由于能够顺利的通过路口而节约的成本为10元。由于节约的成本1,000,000元大于50,000元,设置红绿灯是有效率的。
市场会提供这个有效率的结果吗,可能性比较小。公共物品的非排他性使得通过市场交换获得公共产品的利益这种机制失灵。对于红绿灯提供者而言,他必须能够把那些不付钱而享受红绿灯的人排除在消费之外,否则他将无法弥补生产成本。而对于一个消费者而言,由于公共产品的非排他性,公共产品一旦生产出来,每一个消费者都可以不支付就获得消费的权力,每一个消费者都可以搭便车。消费者这种行为意味者生产公共产品的厂商很有可能得不到弥补生产成本的收益,在长期中,厂商不会提供这种物品,这使得公共物品很难由市场提供。


http://www.econ.ntu.edu.tw/db/education/study/publiceconomy/publicgoods.html
公共财 (Public goods) 是一种集体消费财,表示一旦这种财货被提供,任何人都可以均等的享有。

    一般用来界定一个财货是否为「纯」(pure)公共财,通常有两种指标。公共财具有「非敌对性」(non-rivalness),表示这个财货不能被个别消费者所独享,个人的消费也不能减少他人对此财货的消费,因此必须整体提供。相反的,某人对私有财的消费必然会减损他人可以消费的数量。例如,灯塔。一般用来界定一个财货是否为「纯」(pure)公共财,通常有两种指标。公共财具有「非敌对性」(non-rivalness),表示这个财货不能被个别消费者所独享,个人的消费也不能减少他人对此财货的消费,因此必须整体提供。相反的,某人对私有财的消费必然会减损他人可以消费的数量。例如,灯塔。
    公共财同时也具有「不可排他性」(non-exclusiveness),表示该财货一旦被提供,就可以由多人同时消费,而且不能禁止别人免费享用该财货。例如,阳光,空气,澹水老街。

    我们可以用以下表来区分各种不同的财货。


    由于公共财的无法排他以及非敌对性,公共财的提供往往无法透过个人自愿的捐献而达到有效率的境界。价格机制无法有效的运作,因而导致某些人可以坐享其成。这也就是公共财理论中常会提及的「搭便车」的问题。搭便车的问题常常是主张政府应该介入公共财提供的主要理由。
     计算公共财的价值也与私有财不同。由于每个人消耗公共财的数量相同,公共财的边际利益是将每一个数量下个人的边际利益加总,也就是所谓的「垂直加总」。公共财的效率水准也就决定于公共财的边际成本等同于所有人加总的边际利益时的水准。这就是所谓的Samuelson condition。


Birth of a Smirk: Free Riders and Social Loafers
http://dmangus.blogspot.hk/2012/07/of-free-riding-and-social-loafers.html


From ye Wiki: In economics, collective bargaining, psychology, and political science, a free rider (or freeloader) is someone who enjoys the benefits of an activity without paying for it. The free rider may withhold effort or resources, or may impose the costs of his or her activities on others. The free rider problem is the question of how to limit free riding (or its negative effects).

One consequence of free riding is the excessive use of a common property resource: because people do not take into account the impacts of their actions on others, they take too much from the common pool. In public economics, free riding can lead to the non-production or under-production of a public good. In both of these cases, free riding leads to Pareto inefficiency.

The term free rider comes from the example of someone using public transportation without paying the fare. If too many people do this, the system will not have enough money to operate. Another example of a free rider is someone who does not pay his or her share of taxes, which help pay for public goods that all citizens benefit from, such as roads, water treatment plants, and fire services.

There is considerable debate about the empirical significance of free riding. One famous article asked "Economists free ride. Does anyone else?" Studies generally find that there is some free riding, but less than one would expect based on the predictions of economic theory. Free-riding is most likely to occur in large, anonymous groups, in one-off interactions, and when the stakes are high. The research of Elinor Ostrom and others has found that social norms and institutions can limit the extent of free riding by sanctioning those who do not contribute, or take more than their share from the common pool.

Those seen as free riders are often resented because they are thought to be taking more than their fair share of a resource or failing to shoulder any part of the cost of it. They cause teams to perform less well because other members become less willing to contribute when they think that one or more members are free riding.

People also dislike those they perceive to be free riders because they have a strong aversion to being a sucker (see "sucker effect").

One of the few cases in which neoclassical economists support government provision of goods or intervention in markets, markets for public goods, which may attract free rider problems, will not come to rest at the appropriate equilibrium when left to the invisible hand alone. For example, most governments supply national defense, police forces, and disaster aid which might be vastly under-produced by the private sector. There is some disagreement among economists about which outcomes should not be left to market forces alone, however most would list national defense as a good best produced and distributed by governments.

Social loafing

In the social psychology of groups, social loafing is the phenomenon of people exerting less effort to achieve a goal when they work in a group than when they work alone.

Social loafing is also associated with two concepts that are typically used to explain why it occurs: The "free-rider" theory and the resulting "sucker effect", which is an individual’s reduction in effort in order to avoid pulling the weight of a fellow group member.

Research on social loafing began with rope pulling experiments by Ringelmann, who found that members of a group tended to exert less effort into pulling a rope than did individuals alone. In more recent research, studies involving modern technology, such as online and distributed groups, has also shown clear evidence of social loafing. Many of the causes of social loafing stem from an individual feeling that his or her effort will not matter to the group.

The first known research on the social loafing effect began in 1913 with Max Ringelmann's study. He found that when he asked a group of men to pull on a rope, that they did not pull as hard collectively, as they did when each was pulling alone. This research did not distinguish whether it was the individuals putting in less effort or poor coordination within the group.

In 1974, Alan Ingham and colleagues replicated Ringelmann's experiment using two types of groups: 1) Groups with real participants in groups of various sizes (consistent with Ringelmann's setup) or 2) Pseudo-groups with only one real participant. In the pseudo-groups, the researchers' assistants pretended to pull on the rope. The results showed a decrease in the participant's performance, with groups of participants who all exerted effort suffering the largest declines.

Because the pseudo-groups were isolated from coordination effects (since the researchers' confederates did not physically pull the rope), Ingham proved that communication alone did not account for the effort decrease, and that motivational losses were the more likely cause of the performance decline.

Bibb Latané et al. replicated previous social loafing findings while demonstrating that the decreased performance of groups was attributable to reduced individual effort, distinct from coordination loss. They showed this by blindfolding male college students while making them wear headphones that masked all noise. They then asked them to shout both in actual groups and pseudogroups in which they shouted alone but believed they were shouting with others. When subjects believed one other person was shouting, they shouted 82% as intensely as they did alone, but with five others, their effort decreased to 74%.

Increasing the number of people in a group diminishes the relative social pressure on each person: "If the individual inputs are not identifiable the person may work less hard. Thus if the person is dividing up the work to be performed or the amount of reward he expects to receive, he will work less hard in groups."

As the number of people in the group increase, people tend to feel deindividuation. This term defines both the dissociation from individual achievement and the decrease of personal accountability, resulting in lower exerted effort for individuals in collaborative environments.
People could simply feel "lost in the crowd," so they feel that their effort would not be rewarded even if they put it forth. This idea can also cause people to feel as though they can simply "hide in the crowd" and avoid the averse effects of not applying themselves.

In 1964, an attack on a woman named Kitty Genovese occurred outside an apartment building as witnessed by 38 of her neighbors. Out of the 38 witnesses, not even one person called the police. Following the incident, psychological research focused on the theory that everyone who was watching simply assumed that someone else would call the police. By thinking that someone else had already or was about to take action, others did not think it was necessary to do anything themselves.

When a group member does not feel that his/her effort is justified in the context of the overall group, the individual will be less willing to assert the effort. If the group size is large, members can feel that their contribution will not be worth much to the overall cause because so many other contributions can or should occur. This leads people to not contribute as much or at all in large groups as they might have in smaller groups.

Most people say that voting is important, and a good practice for them to do. However, every year a sub-optimal percentage of Americans turn up to vote, especially in presidential elections (only 51% in the 2000 election). One vote may feel very small in a group of millions, so people may not think it is worth it to vote. If too many people think this way, there is a small percentage of voter turnout.

"Sucker" effect/Aversion

People feel that others in the group will leave them to do all work while they take the credit. Because people do not want to feel like the "sucker," so they wait to see how much effort others will put into a group before they put any in. If all the members try to avoid being the sucker, then everyone's effort will be significantly less than it would be if all of them were working as hard as they could.

For example, in a workplace environment, the establishment of an absence culture creates an attitude that all employees deserve to have a certain number of days of absence, regardless of whether or not they are actually sick. Therefore, if an employee has not used the maximum number of absence days, "he may feel that he is carrying an unfair share of the workload."

If someone feels that others in the group are slacking or that others will slack, he will lower his effort to match that of the others. This can occur whether it is apparent that the others are slacking or if someone simply believes that the group is slacking.

Social loafing is a behavior that organizations want to eliminate. Understanding how and why people become social loafers is critical to the effective functioning, competitiveness and effectiveness of an organization.

The answer to social loafing may be motivation. A competitive environment may not necessarily get group members motivated.

Collaboration is a way to get everyone involved in the group by assigning each member special, meaningful tasks. It is a way for the group members to share the knowledge and the tasks to be fulfilled unfailingly. For example, if Sally and Paul were loafing because they were not given specific tasks, then giving Paul the note taker duty and Sally the brainstorming duty will make them feel essential to the group. Sally and Paul will be less likely to want to let the group down, because they have specific obligations to complete.

Content identifies the importance of the individual's specific tasks within the group. If group members see their role as that involved in completing a worthy task, then they are more likely to fulfill it. For example, Sally may enjoy brainstorming, as she knows that she will bring a lot to the group if she fulfills this obligation. She feels that her obligation will be valued by the group.

Choice gives the group members the opportunity to choose the task they want to fulfill. Assigning roles in a group causes complaints and frustration. Allowing group members the freedom to choose their role makes social loafing less significant, and encourages the members to work together as a team.

Ability and motivation are essential, but insufficient for effective team functioning. A team must also coordinate the skills, efforts, and actions of its members in order to effectively achieve its goal.

Increase identifiability
Promote involvement
Reward team members for performance
Strengthen team cohesion
Increase personal responsibility
Use team contracts
Provide team performance reviews and feedback
Using single-digit teams
Having an agenda
Training team members together
Spending more time practicing
Minimizing links in communication
Setting clear performance standards







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 楼主| 天使投资唐 发表于 2014-10-12 13:48:31 | 显示全部楼层

http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~sam/4080_w12/free_rider/1.pdf
http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~sam/4080_w12/free_rider/2.pdf
http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/~sam/4080_w12/free_rider/3.pdf



Preference Revelation : (a)A Project of Fixed Size
When there is a public good,efficiency requires that the sum of people’s marginal rates of substitution ofthe public good for the private good ( their willingness to pay for the publicgood ) must equal the marginal rate of transformation ( the cost of the publicgood ). If some agency — government, private firm, non–profit agency — is totry and achieve this efficient allocation, it must know people’s demand curvesfor public goods. As Samuelson emphasized, the really big problem with publicgoods is not that the efficiency condition is different from the efficiencycondition with private goods, but that efficiency can’t be achieved without alot of information about people’s preferences.
So what actually happens in theprovision of public goods such as information, national defense andbroadcasting? Sometimes some of these goods ( some of the ones which areexcludable to some degree ) are privately provided. The allocation here willnot be efficient, since typically these firms exclude some people from somebenefits, because the firms are not able to charge different prices todifferent people. Sometimes these goods are financed voluntarily — which meansthat they will be inefficiently under–provided if people behave in aself–interested manner in deciding their contributions. Sometimes they areprovided by government. Since governments ( at least those in democraticcountries ) are elected, the government officials have some incentive to pleasepeople if they want to get re–elected. But elections do not enable people toconvey exactly their preferences over public goods to politicians.
Public good providers could tryand find out exactly what are people’s preferences for public goods by askingthem. This seldom happens in practice. If people were asked their preferencesfor public goods, it seems reasonable to conclude that many people would behavein a self–interested manner in responding. That is, people would not tell thetruth about their demand curves for public goods unless it was in their owninterest to do so.
In other words, if people weresurveyed about their demand curves for public goods, we should not assume thatpeople respond truthfully. Rational, selfish people should try and manipulatethe survey in their own interests. That makes the survey a game, that is a situation in people behave strategically. Rational selfish people, responding to a survey,will understand the rules of the game, that is how their responses to thesurvey will affect the taxes they pay and the quantities of public goods thatthey consume. Then they will choose their answers to the survey so as toachieve the outcome most favourable to them.
“Simple” questionnaires, in whichpeople simply are asked what are their demands for the public good, would notinduce people to tell the truth ( if people are clever and behave strategically). If people figured out that the government would implement some sort ofbenefit tax system, in which people who expressed a strong demand for thepublic good would pay more in taxes, then people would have an incentive to understate their preferences.
Suppose instead people figuredout that public goods would not be finance by benefit taxation, but would befinanced out of general tax revenue. Then they might not understate theirpreference.
If a person learned that parks were to befinanced by a cigarette tax, then if the person were a non–smoker she wouldrealize that she would be getting the parks at no cost to herself. Assumingthat cigarette taxes are born entirely by smokers, the added cost of anyexpansion of the park system, if financed by a cigarette tax, would be paidonly by smokers. In this case, the non–smoker does not have an incentive tounderstate her benefits from parks. The value of the benefits which she reportsin the survey don’t affect her tax payments. But she would now have anincentive to overstate herpreferences. If someone else is paying for the parks, then she might as wellexaggerate the benefits she gets. That would make the government agency morelikely to go ahead with the project, or to expand the project. In general, fora person to figure out what would be the best response to a survey about herdemand for the public good might be pretty complicated, and it might depend onher guesses about what other people were responding. But figuring out the beststrategy, although complicated, would be a better option than simply tellingthe truth.
However, it turns out that if the taxes people pay arebased on the responses they give, and if the taxes are designed cleverly enough,then people will want to tell the truth, even if they have figured out how thesystem works. That is, there are mechanisms which will induce people to tellthe truth about their tastes for public goods, even if they areself–interested, and even if no–one else knows their preferences — if peoplecorrectly figure out how the tax system works.
One feature that is needed for these mechanisms to work is that the government (or whoever is asking thequestions) can commit to themechanism. That is, a mechanism is a set of rules which the governmentannounces. It will be assumed here that the government will actually use therules it announces, and that people believe that the government will use theserules. In the example below, the government proposes rules, for how it will taxpeople, based on responses people give to a questionnaire. In order for thismechanism to work, the government must actually go ahead and use those rules,once the questionnaire has been answered. So it will be taken for granted herethat the government will not try and change the rules once it has someinformation, and that people believe that the rules actually will be used.
An Example : A Facility of Fixed Size
As an example, consider the issue of whether of not tobuild some public facility of a fixed scale, such as a stadium or theatre. Thesimplification here is that there is no possibility of varying the scale of thefacility : the question is an “all or nothing” issue of whether to build thefacility or not. Suppose that the facility costs $100,000,000 to build. Supposeas well that the government agency is trying to make its decision (whether ornot to build the facility) efficiently : to build the facility if the totaldollar value of all the people’s expressed benefits for the stadium exceed thecost.
If people were telling the truth,then that would be a good criterion for the government to use : the project isworth undertaking if the benefits (in dollars) from the project, added up overall people, exceeded the cost of the project.
Assume that there are 1 millionpeople in the city, so that the government is going to ask each person tostate, in dollars, what the stadium is worth to him or her. If the sum of theseannounced valuations exceed $100,000,000, then the facility will be built.
Further, assume that the cost ofthe stadium, if it is built, will be split equally, $100 per person, among thecity’s residents.
Now if the government simply announces that the stadiumwill be built if the sum of the announced valuations exceeds $100,000,000, andalso announces that the cost will be shared equally among all people, people donot have an obvious incentive to tell the truth. [What are the incentives?That’s left to the reader. So think about how you might want to answer a survey,if you knew that you truly valued the project at $25, and if you knew that youwould be assessed a tax of $100 if the project were built. Now think about howyou’d want to answer the survey if you knew that the project was really worth$200 to you, and you still expected to be taxed $100 if the project were built,regardless of your answer.]
But in the mechanism I will present here, the governmentputs in an additional tax, a taxwhich applies only if a person’s answer affects the decision. That tax is assessedin addition to the share of the project which a person will pay, if the projectis built. And it might be assessed even if the project is not built.
Some notation : for person 1, let V˜1 denote the total of everyone else’s announced valuationfor the facility, leaving out person 1’s own announced valuation. Let v1 be the valuation thatperson 1 announces. So
V˜1 ≡ v2 + v3 + ··· + v1000000
where vi is what person i says that the project is worth to her.(Of course what she says it’s worth to her may not be what she really thinksthat it is worth to her : we don’t know her true preferences, just what shetells us her preferences are.)
One of the rules the government will stick to is that thefacility will be built if the some of people’s announced values exceeds thecost of the facility, which is $100,000,000. From the definition above of V˜1, as the sum of everyoneelse’s announced value (except for person 1’s), that rule can be written :build the facility if and only if
V˜1+ v1 ≥ 100,000,000
If the facilityis built, then everyone will pay a tax of $100 to pay for it. But further,person 1 may pay a special tax, if her response turns out to be pivotal, that is if her responseaffects the decision whether or not to build the facility.
Specifically, if
V˜1< 99,999,900
and if
V˜1+ v1 > 100,000,000
then person 1’s response is pivotal : the facility would not havebeen built without her response being as big as it was. In other words, if theannounced values of all the other people were less than $100 per person, thenthe facility won’t be built, since the cost per person is greater than thebenefit per person (or at least it’s less than the average value of what peoplesay are their benefits). In these circumstances, if person 1 says that herbenefit is really high, then, once her announced benefit is taken into account,the average benefit of all 1,000,000 people will be greater than the cost perperson, so the facility will be built.
Of course, this may not happen.But if it does happen that V˜1 < 99,999,900, and that V˜1 +v1 ≥ 100,000,000, then person 1is said to be pivotal, since her response to the survey affects the overalldecision.
In that case, she will have to pay aspecial “pivot tax” of
99,999,900 − V˜1
on top of the regular tax of $100. As well,if
V˜1≥ 99,999,900
and
V˜1+ v1 < 100,000,000
then person 1 would again be pivotal, sincein this case her low announced valuation keeps the facility from being built.In this case, she would also have to pay a pivot tax, this time equal to
V˜1− 99,999,900
( In this case,she is paying a tax, even though the facility is not being built, just becauseshe influenced the decision not to build the facility by announcing such a lowvalue ).
Why $99,999,900, and not$100,000,000 in calculating the pivot tax? Because we’re going to build thefacility only if people’s average valuationexceeds the cost per person of $100. I’m pivotal if the average valuation, notincluding mine, is less than $100, and if my announced valuation pulls theaverage above $100 — or if the average valuation, not including mine, weregreater than $100, and if my announced valuation pulls the average below $100.
Now, it might seem that thisextra tax would not induce a person to want to tell the truth. It might seemthat it would induce her to want to understate her preferences, to avoid the“pivot” tax.
But suppose that she doesunderstate her true valuation. Suppose, for example, that the facility reallyis worth $200 to her. Would it pay her to lie, say to state a valuation of only$100? The effect of her lie depends on what everyone else has stated. If V˜1 is greater than
$100,000,000, then the facility gets builtwhatever she says is her valuation. In this case, she is not pivotal, the facility gets built no matter what she says, andshe pays $100 as her share of the cost. Since she won’t be stuck with the pivottax, and since the facility will be built whether she tells the truth or lies,then there is no incentive to lie. Remember : a person pays a pivot tax only ifher answer changes the result.
What if V˜1< 99,999,800? Then if shetells the truth ( v1 = 200), the facility will not get built. She can get it built if she exaggerates hervaluation enough — but then she’ll get hit with a pivot tax. For example, if
V1 = 99,999,700
and she announces v1 = 400, her lie gets the facility built, since itpushes the sum of announced valuations above $100,000,000. That gets her afacility, a facility which is worth $200 to her — but she would have to paytaxes of $300, the regular $100 tax plus a pivot tax of $99,999,900 − $99,999,700= $200. So it’s not in her interest to overstate her benefit. Overstating onlymakes a difference if she is pivotal. And if she is pivotal, then the extrapivot tax she pays for affecting the decision is greater than the benefit shegets from the facility.
If V˜1 isbetween $99,999,800 and $99,999,900, then person 1 would be pivotal if shetells the truth (remember: her true valuation here is assumed to be $200). Shecan avoid the pivot tax by understating her valuation. For instance, if V˜1 = 99,999,850, she couldannounce a valuation of $100, which would mean that the facility would not bebuilt, and she would avoid paying any pivot tax. But in this instance, herpivot tax is only $50 ( 99,999,900−V˜1). She would be better off telling the truth, even though it means payingher regular tax of $100 and herpivot tax of $50, because then she would get to have a facility which is worth$200 to her : telling the truth, and paying a total tax of $150 to get afacility built which is worth $200 is a better strategy than understating herpreferences, paying nothing, and getting nothing..
Finally, if V˜1 is between $99,999,900 and $100,000,000, she couldprevent the facility from being built by understating her true valuationenough. But that would be bad for her in two ways. First of all, she won’t getthe facility. Secondly, in this case her lie would make her pivotal, since herlie, announcing a low valuation was the reason that the facility was not built.So telling the truth gets her a facility worth $200, at a cost of $100, in thiscase. Understating a lot gets her no facility, and a pivot tax as well!
So what should she do?
The odds are that she won’t haveany influence on the outcome. In that case, it doesn’t matter whether she liesor tells the truth. She is only 1 person among 1,000,000. Her answer onlymatters if the other valuations average out close to $100 per person, so thatshe could be pivotal. And in that case, the analysis above shows that she isbetter off telling the truth than lying. The pivot tax she might end up payingcan never exceed $100 if she tells the truth ( if her true valuation is $200 ),so she would be better off telling the truth, affecting the result, getting thefacility built, and paying the pivot tax, than understating her preference tododge a small pivot tax.
Notice that the pivot tax does not depend specifically onwhat she states as her valuation, only on whether she affects the result, andon how that change affects other people. For example, if
V˜1= 99,999,850
then her pivot tax will be
V˜1− 99,999,900 = 50
whenever she ispivotal in getting the facility built, that is whenever v1 > 150.Understating her valuation slightly ( say stating it’s $180 instead of her true$200 ) won’t reduce her pivot tax : it’s $50 whenever v1 > 150.The only way understating reduces her pivot tax is if she states v1 < 150, in which case she dodges the pivot tax — but also doesn’tget her facility.
Now person 1 actually doesn’tknow what everyone else has stated, at the time she is asked her valuation. Shehas to decide her announcement, v1,without knowing what is her V˜1(the sum of everyone else’s vi’s).But the paragraphs above show that she really doesn’t need to know what otherpeople have announced. Either lying about her valuation will have no effect atall, on either whether the facility gets built, or on her taxes ( the mostlikely situation ), or it will have an effect. And if it will have an effect,she is strictly better off telling the truth than lying. In other words, giventhe rules of this tax scheme, telling the truth is a dominant strategy for person 1. Whatever other people’s valuationsare, and regardless of whether they tell the truth or lie, there is no strategyfor person 1 which is any better than simply telling the truth about what thefacility is worth to her.
Person 1’s decision process is nodifferent than any other person’s. Person 2 has a similar situation : he willhave to pay a pivot tax if the average of the other 999,999 people’s announcedvaluations is less than $100, and his announcement pushes the average over$100, or if the other people’s average valuation is more than $100, and his lowannounced valuation pushes the overall average below $100. So each person will,if she or he understands the tax rules correctly, want to tell the truth. Eventhough the government has no idea about any person’s true valuation, it candesign a tax scheme which — if understood correctly — will induce everyone toreveal their preferences, because it is in each person’s self–interest to doso.
So who’s pivotal? That depends onthe distribution of people’s actual valuations. It might be nobody. For exampleif we had 100 people who valued a facility at $102, 100 people who valued it at$99, and if the facility cost $20,000 to build, then no individual will pay apivot tax if everyone tells the truth.. ( You should check that, in this case, V˜i +vi >19,900 for each person, ifeveryone tells the truth. ) It could be that a lot of people are pivotal : if10 people valued a facility at $151, 10 valued it at $50, and if the facilitycost $2000, then each high–valuation person would face a V˜i of$1859¡$1900, and would pay a pivot tax of $41 if everyone told the truth.
What does the government do withthe pivot tax revenue? Notice that this pivot tax revenue ( if there is any )would be money which is over and above the cost of the facility. That may seemlike a nice situation, but the government actually would have to be careful notto return this excess to the taxpayers. Why? If taxpayers realized that theywould be getting a share of the pivot tax revenue, then they might start toadjust their responses, so as to make other people pay more pivot taxes.Figuring this effect out would be very complicated, but if people were reallyclever it would ( very slightly ) offset the incentive to tell the truth.




Preference Revelation : (b)A Project of Variable Size
In the example in the previoussection, the project being considered had a fixed size, so that the public goodprovision decision was an “all or nothing” decision : either build the facilityor don’t build the facility.
In this section, a somewhat morecomplicated problem is considered : determining the quantity to provide of apure public good. So, unlike the project considered in the previous section,the problem considered here is how much to provide of a pure public good, thatis, how to implement the Samuelson rule when people’s preferences are not known(except by the people themselves).
The variable being chosen here is the quantity Z of some pure public good. It isassumed that each person has a downward–sloping demand curve for the publicgood, a demand curve which the person knows, but which no–one else knows. Sonow the preference revelation mechanism must get people to announce theirwillingness to pay for the public good, as a function of the quantity Z providedof the public good.
Each person i will be asked to report her willingness to pay vi(Z) for the public good. vi(Z) is the amount, in dollars, that theperson would be willing to pay for a little more of the public good, if aquantity Z is provided. Or it’s whatperson i says is what she is willingto pay : we have no way of verifying whether what she reports is her truewillingness to pay schedule, or not. As in the pivot tax of the previoussection, the preference revelation mechanism here uses a fairly complicated taxrule, which should induce each person to report truthfully herwillingness–to–pay schedule, if she understands the tax rules, and if she wantsto manipulate the system to her own advantage.
The notation used here will bequite similar to the notation used in the previous sub–section : the maindifference is that now people have to report a whole demand curve, not just a single number. So vi(Z) will denote the demand schedule which person i reports, some downward–slopingfunction, representing what she says she would be willing to pay for a littlemore of the public good, as a function of the amount provided. This vi(Z) denotes person i’s reported MRS function. As in the previous section, we cannot tell whetherperson i is telling the truth or not— but we’d like to make it worth her while to tell the truth.
The marginal cost of eachunit of the public good will be denoted c.That’s just the MRT.
The government wants to provide an efficient allocation. Sothe quantity Z∗ which itwill actually provide will depend on the demand schedules reported by thepeople, and it will obey the Samuelson rule, for the reported demand schedules. That is, once all the people havereported their demand schedules for the public good, then the level that willactually get provided is the solution Z∗to the equation
                                                                        v1(Z∗) + v2(Z∗) + ··· + vN(Z∗) = c                                                                  (1)
when the N people report their demand schedules. Equation (1) is theSamuelson condition, except with people’s reportedMRS’s, vi(Z) used,since we don’t actually know their true MRSschedules.
As in the simple “pivot tax” mechanismwith a project of fixed size, a person’s tax liabilities here will have twoparts. First of all, part 1 of the tax is simply the person’s share of the costof the public good. So each of the N peoplehas to pay a fraction 1/N of the costof the public good. If T denotes thisfirst part of the tax, then for each person i,
                                                                                               file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image002.gif                                                                                       (2)
since the public good costs c per unit, Z∗ units are being provided, and the cost is beingdivided among all of the N people.
The second part of each person’stax is again a “pivot tax”, determined by how the person’s reportedwillingness–to–pay schedule alters the provision of the public good.
As in the previous section, consider person 1’s taxes, andher incentives to manipulate the system. As before, let V˜1 denote the sum of everyone else’s announced willingness to pay.
V˜1(Z) ≡ v2(Z) + v3(Z) + ··· + vN(Z)
So the Samuelson rule (1),which the government has promised to use, can now be written
                                                                                     v1(Z∗) + V˜1(Z∗) = c                                                                              (3)
As before,consider what level of the public good would be provided, if person 1’sannounced preferences were not taken into account, but her contribution to thecost were also left out. So define the level of public good provision Z˜1 by theequation
                                                  file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image004.gif                                         (4)
In figure 1, the horizontal dotted linerepresents the MRT. But the lowerhorizontal green dashed lines the MRT minusperson 1’s contribution. The downward–sloping green dashed line is the verticalsum of everyone else’s announced demand curves. In the diagram, Z˜1 equals 5, where thevertical sum of everyone else’s announced demand curves crosses a line with aheight (N − 1)/N times the MRT.
Notice that person 1 does not get to affect Z˜1 : Z˜1 isdetermined only by the announced demands of other people.
The second part of person 1’s tax, the pivot tax, is thearea between the vertical sum of everyone else’s announced demand curves, andtheir share [N − 1)/N]cof the costs, between the level Z˜1of the public good which would be provided without person 1, and thelevel Z∗ which is actuallyprovided. In figure 1, it’s the triangle outlined in green, and labelled PT (for “pivot tax”). Mathematically,the area under a curve is measured using the integral of the function. So
                                                                       file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image006.gif                                                               (5)
In figure 1, Z∗ is to the right of Z˜1 : Z˜1 = 5 and Z∗ = 6 in that figure. That’sbecause, in this example, person 1 seems to have a relatively strong demand forthe public good, so including her valuation pushes up the quantity chosen. Butthat need not be the case : figure 2 illustrates a case in which person 1announces a lower valuation than the average of the other people, so thatincluding her actually reduces the quantity provided. In that case, there isstill a pivot tax PT in the figure :again its the area between Z˜1and Z∗, between thevertical sum of everyone else’s announced willingness to pay, and their sharesof the cost. So formula (5) applies whether or not Z∗ is greater than Z˜1.
Person 1’s total taxes are justthe sum of the first part of her taxes, her share of the cost,and her pivottax. That is, in figure 1, her taxes are the triangle labelled PT, plus the red rectangle labelled “taxof person 1 : part 1”.
This tax PT really is a generalization of the pivot tax used in the previoussection. When including person 1 affects the level of public good provided, sheis assessed this extra tax. Except with a variable public good, she’ll always(except by extreme coincidence) have some affect on the quantity provided, sothat she’ll aways have some pivot tax to pay.
How is person 1’s pivot tax affected by her reported demandschedule? To answer that, consider how PTis affected by the quantity Z∗of the public good which is actually provided. That is, how does thevalue of PT in expression (5) changewith the level Z∗ ofpublic good provision?
To answer that,remember thefundamental theorem of calculus, that the derivative of the integral of afunction is just the function itself :
file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image008.gif
Here, equation (5) thensays that
                                                                             file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image010.gif)                                                                      (6)
[Why does thatmake sense in the diagram? How much would the green triangle labelled PT grow if Z∗ moved a little to the right? The rate of increasewould be the height of the triangle, the distance between (N − 1)/N and V˜1(Z∗).]
There also is a little sense tothis expression (6) for the marginal pivot tax. Suppose that person 1 gets thegovernment to provide a little more of the public good. How does that affectthe other people? The added cost that they would have to pay (since person 1only has to pay for her share 1/N ofthe public good) is [(N − 1)N]cper unit. The added benefit they say that they would get (added up over allthe other people) is V˜1(Z∗). So the marginal pivottax is the net harm person 1 would do to these other people, if she gets thepublic sector to expand, past the point where the cost to these other peopleequals the benefit they get.
Suppose now that person 1 were really clever, and couldmanipulate the system to get any level Z∗of the public good that she wanted. What would her total taxes be, from aslight increase in the level of public good provision? From equations (2) and(6), the change in her total tax (part 1 plus the pivot tax) would be
                                                               file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image012.gif)                                                         (7)
Equation (7) can be simplifiedto
                                                                            file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image014.gif)                                                                     (8)
Notice that if Z> Z˜1, person 1 would have to pay moretax if she could somehow get the government to provide more of the public good.
But she also does get somebenefit from the public good. She doesn’t want to minimize her taxes : shewants to get the most benefit for the least taxes. So let
p1(Z)
denote person 1’strue marginal willingness to pay fora little more of the public good. Only she knows that. But it does representwhat she really does think a little more of the public good is worth. If p1(Z) is greater than the marginal taxes she would have to pay, thenshe would like to see the public good provision expanded. p1(Z) representsthe benefit to her of a little more of the public good. Given the complicatedtax rules — and given everyone else’s announced benefits — the right side ofequation (8) represents the marginal cost to her of a little more of the publicgood.
So if she could completely manipulate the system, and getany level Z∗ of the publicgood that she wanted, then she would want a level Z∗ such that her true marginal benefit equalled theincrease in her taxes :
                                                                                    p1(Z∗) = c V˜1(Z∗)                                                                              (9)
But the government has announced alreadywhat it will do to determine the public good level that it provides. It’s usingequation (3), which I can re–write as
                                                                                     v1(Z∗) = c V˜1(Z∗)                                                                           (10)
Now look atequations (9) and (10). Equation (9) is the level of public good provision shewants, given this complicated tax rule. Equation (10) is the public goodprovision she will get, given that the government uses the Samuelson ruleapplied to people’s announced demand curves. She can make what she gets intowhat she wants pretty simply : as long as v1(Z∗) = p1(Z∗),then equations (9) and (10) are the same.
So she can get the best level of public good provision,from her selfish perspective, simply by telling the truth. Announcing a demandschedule
v1(Z) = p1(Z)
will guaranteethat the solutions to equations (9) and (10) are the same, whatever the otherpeople do. In the language of game theory, given these tax rules, announcingher true demand schedule is a dominantstrategy to the game played by the taxpayers.
So, if people are clever andselfish, the government can get them to reveal voluntarily their willingness topay for the public good, if it uses the Samuelson rule to provide the publicgood, and if it sticks to a policy of making each person’s taxes equal the twoparts, T + PT.
Not only does this mechanism getpeople to tell the truth, and provide the efficient quantity of the publicgood, it also ensures that there is enough tax revenue to pay for the publicgood. If we add up the first part of the taxes, over all people, the revenuesums up to cZ∗, exactlythe cost of the public good. Then there are the pivot taxes PT. These must be non–negative : if Z> Z˜1, then [(N − 1)N]c > V˜1(Z) for Z˜1 < Z < Z∗, so the pivot tax triangle has positivearea. But if person 1 announces a low demand, and Z˜1 > Z∗, then V˜1(Z) >[(N − 1)/N]c for Z< Z < Z˜1, so that the pivot taxtriangle defined by expression (5) (and illustrated in figure 2) is againpositive : person 1 is taxed for reducing public good provision, when otherpeople value the marginal units of the public good more highly than the shareof the cost that the have to pay.




Preference Revelation : (c)Complications and Difficulties
The preference revelationmechanism described in the previous two sections make it a dominant strategy for a person to tell the truth about the valueshe places on a public good. That is, if she understands the mechanism, and ifthe government commits credibly to obeying its own rules — the level to provideof the public good, the method of dividing up the cost, the rules for theadditional pivot tax — then the person’s own self–interest is best served ifshe announces exactly what her true demand for the public good is. Any attemptto misrepresent her preferences cannot make her better off, and may make herworse off. The fact that this is a dominant strategy for the person means thattelling the truth is the best strategy for her, regardless what other peoplechoose to do when they decide how to report their own preferences.
In this section, some extensions of the mechanism arediscussed briefly, and also some potential weaknesses.
Sharing the Cost
In the mechanism presented in theprevious sections, each person’s tax had two elements. The first quantity washer share of the cost of the public good, and the second was the pivot tax thatshe would have to pay if her answer altered the provided of the public good.
It was assumed that her share of the cost was simply afraction 1/N, where N is the total number of people. Thatis, it was assumed that the cost was divided equally among all the people. Thisassumption is unnecessary. Instead, it could be replaced with the followingrule : for each person i, there issome share si of the costof the public good that the person must pay. So (in the variable–quantity publicgood of section (b) above), if thetotal cost of a level Z of the publicgood were cZ, then person i would have to pay sicZ in taxes to cover her share of the cost. The share si does not have to be the same for all people. All that is required is thatthe shares do pay for the public good
s1 + s2 + ··· + sN = 1
and that eachperson knows her own share.
The rule for determining the quantity of the public good isnot changed. The quantity Z∗ satisfiesthe condition
v1(Z∗) + v2(Z∗)+ ··· + vN(Z∗) = c
as before.
The basic idea of the pivot tax is unchanged. Now the rulefor the pivot tax is changed slightly. The quantity Z˜1 which would be chosen if person 1 were left out ofthe process is now determined as
v2(Z˜1) + v3(Z˜1) + ··· + vN(Z˜1)= (1 − s1)c
Sothe right hand side of the equation has been modified ; but it still representsthe unit cost of the public good, excluding person 1’s share of the cost. If Z> Z˜1, then the pivot tax paid by person1 would be
file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image002.gif
so that again, the only change is to replaceNN−1c with (1 − s1)c.
With this slightly modified mechanism, it will still be thecase that telling the truth is a dominant strategy for person #1 (and for anyother person, if the pivot tax is defined analogously). Of course, people wouldprefer that they be assessed a lower share siof the cost. But given that the shares have already been determined,the best a person can do, when surveyed, is to reveal her preferencestruthfully.
General Equilibrium Preference Revelation
In the “variable quantity”mechanism (presented in the second part of this section), people are asked tostate their entire inverse demand curve for the public good, some function vi(Z) expressing how much they are willing to pay for a little more ofthe public good, as a function of the quantity provided. Of course, if thedemand curve sloped down, they could just as easily state their regular demandcurve, the quantity of the public good which they would be willing to buy atdifferent prices, were the good excludable and available for sale on privatemarkets. The willingness–to–pay curve vi(Z) is just the inverse of this demandfunction.
However, ordinarily quantitydemanded depends not only on price, but on other variables, such as the pricesof other goods and services, and on the person’s income. if the public goodwere a normal good then increases ina person’s income would shift the whole demand curve to the right. So we wouldhave to write the inverse demand curve as vi(Z,Mi) if the good werenormal, where Mi was theperson’s disposable income, and where ∂vi/∂Mi> 0 because the good is normal.
So changes in a person’sdisposable income will shift her demand curve for a good, unless the incomeelasticity of demand for the good were exactly zero.
But with the mechanism used here,the person may be charged a pivot tax. The amount of the pivot tax depends onthe person’s answers to the survey, but also on everyone else’s answers to thesurvey. Paying a pivot tax will lower the person’s disposable income. So theamount that the person has to pay in pivot tax should affect her demand curve,if the good is normal. The higher the pivot tax, the further the demand curveshifts down and to the left (if the good is normal).
But the person does not knoweveryone else’s answers to the survey, at the time that she must figure out herown announced demand curve. So, if the good is normal, she must know the pivottax to correctly figure out her own demand curve, and this is information shewill not have.
This problem can be avoided onlyif changes in her disposable income have no effect on the location of herdemand curve for the public good — in other words, if the income elasticity ofher demand for the public good is zero.
If the income elasticity of demand is non–zero, then themechanism cannot be so simple.
For that reason, the mechanismspresented previously in this section are described as “partial equilibrium”preference revelation mechanisms, in that they ignore income effects. If incomeeffects are significant, then a somewhat different mechanism is needed, a “generalequilibrium” mechanism.
Unfortunately, generalequilibrium preference revelation mechanisms do not work as well as partialequilibrium equilibrium mechanisms. It turns out not be possible to design ageneral equilibrium mechanism which i takesinto account these income effects ; ii alwaysguarantees that enough money will be raised to pay for the public good ; iii makes telling the truth a dominantstrategy for all people.
It is possible to design general equilibrium preferencerevelation mechanisms which satisfy properties i and ii above, for whichtelling the truth is a Nash equilibrium.That is, telling the truth is best for me, if I know that everyone else istelling the truth. This is a much less powerful property than having tellingthe truth as a dominant strategy. Now people will only be willing to tell thetruth if they think other people are doing the same thing. With a dominantstrategy, as in the partial equilibrium preference revelation mechanism, I ambest telling the truth, even if I suspect that other people may not understandthe rules, and may not themselves reveal their own preferences. Not so withthese general equilibrium mechanisms.
Where does the Money Go?
The (partial equilibrium)preference revelation mechanism was constructed so that the first part of thetax, the people’s cost shares, exactly paid for the cost of the public good, nomatter what quantity of the public good was chosen. The second part of the tax,the pivot tax, will be positive or zero for each person. It cannot be negative.So the government, if it uses this mechanism, will be guaranteed to collect atleast enough money to pay for the public good, more than enough if the pivottax actually collects positive revenue.
What should be done with the excess revenue, the moneycollected through the pivot tax?
It cannot be given back topeople. If I knew that I was going to get a share of any pivot tax revenue,then I should take account of this possibility in making my decision. Everyextra dollar I pay in pivot taxes will actually get me back some money. But takinginto account this effect will change my decision–making. It adds another terminto my calculation, and it is no longer going to be true that telling thetruth is a dominant strategy.
This will also be the case if Iget any share of the pivot tax revenue collected from other people. If I amperson #2, my answer to the survey affects the pivot tax schedule faced byperson #1. If I, person #2, am going to get some share of that revenue, then Ishould take into account how my answer to the survey affects this tax yield.Again, taking this effect into account may have only a small effect, but itwill change my optimal strategy slightly, away from telling the exact truth.
A similar problem will arise ifthe government uses the pivot tax revenue to pay for some other category ofpublic expenditure. As long as part of the pivot tax money is going to fundsome service which is useful to me, or going to reduce my income taxes, then Ishould take into account how my answer to the survey affects the total pivot taxrevenue. And taking this effect into account will alter slightly my incentiveto tell the truth.
So the mechanism will work perfectly only if the governmentcan commit not to spend the pivot tax revenue on anything useful to the peoplebeing surveyed. They could just throw the money away. A better approach wouldbe to commit to spend the money on other people. They could, for example, makea deal with another jurisdiction, that the other jurisdiction would get theirpivot tax revenue, and they would get the other jurisdiction’s. Once this dealis completed, I do not care about how my answers to the survey affect pivot taxrevenue. The revenue will be spent in another jurisdiction. I will get somemoney from another jurisdiction’s pivot tax, but my answer to the survey willhave no affect on how much gets collected in the other jurisdiction. Similarly,if the Ontario government used a preference revelation mechanism to findbenefits from subway projects in the Toronto area, they could earmark the pivottax revenue for expenditure in Northern Ontario (and perhaps earmark pivot taxrevenue from a survey of Northern Ontarians’ benefits from highway expansion tobe spent only in the Toronto area).
Collusion
The (partial equilibrium)preference revelation mechanism is immune to manipulation by individuals. Thatis, if I understand the mechanism, there is no way that I can do better bylying than by telling the truth.
Unfortunately, itis not immune too manipulation by groupsof people.
As an example, suppose that therewere three people, and an all–or–nothing (fixed quantity) public good was beingconsidered. The public good has a total cost of $1200, so that it will be builtif and only if the sum of the announced valuations of the three people sum to anumber which is greater than or equal to $1200. Suppose that the truevaluations of the three people are $700, $350, and $350. If each person tellsthe truth, then the project will be built, since the sum of the valuations is$1400. But person #1 is pivotal. In this case
file:///C:/Users/VT/AppData/Local/Temp/msohtmlclip1/01/clip_image004.gif
If everyone tellsthe truth, person #1 will be assessed a pivot tax of $100 (= NN−1C v2 − v3 = 800 − 350 − 350). She isbetter off getting a project built than not : she finds the project is worth$700 to her, and she has to pay only $500 in taxes (her share of $400, plus thepivot tax of $100). So she would not want to lie.
But she can benefit from making a deal with person 2 tolie, if she has some idea of other people’s true preferences. She could offerperson #1 a small bribe to change her answer v2 from $350 to (say) $500. If v2 = 500, and if persons #1 and #3 tell the truth, thenno person is pivotal : here v1 +v2 = 1200, v2 +v3 = 850, and v1+v3 = 1050, so that vi +vj > 800 for any two people i and j : the projectwould still be built even if any one person’s share of the costs, and announcedbenefits, were left out.
So if person #2 changes hisanswer from $350 to $500, then no–one is pivotal, and no pivot tax is paid.This change saves person #1 $100, since it frees her of the pivot taxliability. The change does not hurt person #2 (or person #3) : the projectwould have been built even if person #2 had told the truth, so having himexaggerate his benefits does not change anything. Thus if person #1 pays person#2 $50 to change his answer from $350 to $500, then both person #1 and person#2 are better off than if person #2 had told the truth.
In this example, the lie did notaffect the outcome. But it might. Once people realize that they can colludeprofitably, and that collusion involves lying by one or more of them, then themechanism no longer works.
So, if people can easilynegotiate with each other about how they answer the survey, the preferencerevelation mechanisms presented in this section will be susceptible tomanipulation by groups.




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